On "Getting Away With It"

Any resemblance of any hypothetical characters mentioned hereinafter to real persons, living or dead, is purely coincidental.

Consider this scenario:

It is a "stark and dormy" night. (Who said Bulwer-Lytton is forgotten ?) On an unlit road, a tanker's valve somehow spontaneously opens - nobody ever provides a satisfactory explanation as to how or why - and the road surface is soon covered in a black-ish, smelly, viscous liquid. Some minutes later, a motor-car encounters the liquid, the driver - whom I shall call Mr Cooper - loses control and a very nasty accident happens, resulting in several deaths.

Cooper survives, however.

Is he jailed ? Prosecuted ? Arrested, even ?

No. Instead, he lives on, a free man "without a (legal) stain on his character". As Pat Rabbitte once asked, though, is he happy ?

Many people consider this to be outrageous. Four years later, some - and not just the predictably ignorant or intemperate - still mutter about how "the crook got away with it" (and believe it).

Now, unless you are new here, you will not be surprised to learn that my natural inclination is to resist such talk. I will ask to know which crime the unfortunate Cooper is supposed to have committed, why his broken tail-light or out-of-date driving licence had anything to do with the tragedy, even though they were criminal offences - albeit very minor - and so on.

My guess is that, even if you did not "buy" similar arguments already made by me in this series, you might see some value in them in the context of the hypothetical Mr Cooper.

It's an interesting exercise to discuss - as I have done with some people - why "the Coopers" are likely to get more sympathy (and, in my view, more justice) than "the bankers". Let us not detain ourselves with that discussion now. (We can return to it if there is a desire to do so).

However, in this article, I am going to explore the other side of that argument.

Let's go back to Cooper, and make the picture painted of him a little less straightforward, and thus, arguably, more realistic.

Breathalysed at the scene, he tested positive and while the subsequent blood test showed the alcohol in his blood was well below illegal levels, it also showed traces of psychotropic substances. At the time, however, the law did not specifically make it a criminal offence to drive in this condition.

Police investigation also revealed that Cooper's vehicle had at least two tyres marginally "bald", and that he had almost certainly been both driving too fast for the conditions and, worse, had been doing so with a telephone clamped to an ear with one hand.

All that said, the police had no doubt that none of these circumstances contributed to the tragedy, in which Cooper lost not only his only two children but several close friends who happened to be on the road at the unfortunate time. Even if Cooper's vehicle had been in perfect condition, even if he had had no alcohol or other intoxicants in his blood, had had his licence up to date, and had been driving with perfect care and attention, the people would have all died anyway.

Despite these circumstances, should the police charge Cooper with DDCD ("dangerous driving causing death") or less serious offences under the Road Traffic Acts because, otherwise, he will "get away with it" ?

Am I alone in wondering how a man involved in such a horrific scenario will ever get over it ? To me, the question of him getting away with it is out of place.

I would like to hear from those with a contrary view.

(We are not going to detain ourselves at this point with exploration of the culpability of Lehman Brothers, the haulage firm which owned the oil-tanker - imagine that ! - or of any other dei ex this particular machina. But don't forget the disclaimer above.)

One for the IMF ?

In Ireland, female employees who are pregnant are entitled to 42 weeks maternity leave (26 weeks of which are compulsory). The timing is at the employee's option, but at least two weeks must be before the birth, and four weeks after. This applies to all categories of employees, whether permanent or temporary, up to and including the chief executive officer.

Recently, leading Dublin solicitors William Fry tell me, an employer sought to engage someone on a temporary contract basis in order to do the work of an employee taking such leave. A candidate was selected, who, like all candidates, had been informed of the reason for the employment, and had explicitly confirmed that she envisaged no difficulty in working for the required period of 42 weeks.

On being offered the position, however, she disclosed that she was herself 18 weeks' pregnant. Note that she was already within the period that could form part of her maternity leave, so that after one day's work she could legally demand to be given leave.

The job offer was withdrawn. The offeree complained to The Equality Tribunal, following which an Equality Officer, determined that she had been the victim of illegal discrimination on the grounds of sex was entitled to compensation of €12,697, the equivalent of approximately 18 weeks' pay at the Average Industrial Wage.

A fuller account is here. A hat-tip for informing me via Twitter of this story goes to Rossa McMahon.

Update on Wednesday, May 11, 2011 at 07:40AM by Fergus O'Rourke

Amended to delete reference to The Equality Authority

The Perils of a Solicitor's Undertaking

A recent decision by the Irish High Court (Peart J.) exposes some of the sloppy banking and legal practices which characterised the Madness, and have contributed to the scale of the crash. The case is remarkable in a number of ways and I may return to the sloppy practices on another occasion.

I will here confine myself to noting this summary by Peart J. - a former solicitor, be it noted ! - of how the court will approach an application to enforce a solicitor's undertaking:

In summary, the following principles emerge from the judgment of Laffoy J. and Geoghegan J. in Coleman, and the authorities considered therein:

1. The Court has an inherent jurisdiction in matters concerning the conduct of solicitors, being officers of the court, including but not confined to compliance with their undertakings.
2. It is both a punitive and compensatory jurisdiction.
3. It is discretionary and unfettered in nature requiring each case to be considered on its own facts and circumstances.
4. In its exercise, the Court is concerned to uphold the integrity of the system, and the highest standards of honourable behaviour by its officers - a standard higher than that required by law generally.
5. The order made by the Court can take whatever form best serves the interests of justice between the parties.
6. In the matter of undertakings, the Court must consider the entire undertaking in order to reach a conclusion as to its real ultimate purpose.
7. The Court may order compliance with the undertaking, though late, where there remains a reasonable possibility of so doing.
8. Even where the undertaking may still be complied with, the Court may nevertheless order the solicitor to make good any loss actually occasioned by the breach of undertaking, which may or may not be the entire of the sum which was the subject of the undertaking.
9. Where compliance is not possible to achieve by the time the Court is deciding what order to make, if any, it may order the solicitor to make good any loss actually occasioned by the breach of undertaking.
10. Carelessness or other form of negligence on the part of the person affected by the undertaking, and in relation to the matter the subject thereof, may be a factor which the Court will have regard to when determining what order may be fair and just.
11. Any order the Court may make ought not be oppressive on the solicitor. Nevertheless, gross carelessness or other conduct considered sufficiently egregious by the Court, though falling short of criminal behaviour or even professional misconduct, will entitle the Court, should it consider it just to do so, to order payment of the entire sum which was the subject of the undertaking, and not simply a lesser sum in respect of loss actually occasioned by the breach of undertaking.

To these statements of principle which I perceive to emerge from Coleman and the other cases referred to therein, I would add one other which is linked in a way to that at 11 above.

It is this. It seems to me that the special supervisory jurisdiction being exercised by the Court in these matters is not unlike an equitable jurisdiction, given the wide discretionary nature thereof, and its objective of ensuring that justice is done between the parties in a broad sense.

In my view, therefore, it seems to me that it is not inappropriate or otherwise wrong for this Court to have regard to the overall behaviour of the solicitor, somewhat akin to seeing whether a person who is claiming an equitable relief has come to court with clean hands, even where the undertaking may be still reasonably capable of being completed, and even where the loss actually occasioned and sustained by the claimant may be less than the entire sum which was the subject of the undertaking.

The Court went on to order that the firm of solicitors should pay over to the bank the entire amount of the loan (€3m) plus interest and costs. This was approximately €1 million more than it would cost to belatedly comply with the undertaking.

Now, that's what I call "non-oppression".

Update on Saturday, March 6, 2010 at 09:01PM by Fergus O'Rourke

(This is my second attempt to publish this follow-up; I was unaware that the first attempt, made almost exactly 24 hours ago, was unsuccessful, for mysterious reasons, until a few minutes ago).

In relation to the "oppression" point, it should be pointed out that, under the option suggested by the solicitors but rejected by the court, the bank, instead of getting its €3 million back with interest, would have been provided with security worth about €0.6 million.

Update on Friday, June 29, 2012 at 07:09AM by Fergus O'Rourke

This decision by the High Court (McGovern J.) - though the circumstances are very different - is another example of how expensive failures to comply with undertakings can be. (A hat-tip to Mark Tottenham at Stare Decisis Hibernia for this, and much else).

Update on Friday, November 8, 2013 at 10:19AM by Fergus O'Rourke

The case citation links in this post have now been repaired.

An End to Imprisonment for Debt ?

In a note written in 2006 (you'll find it here) I confidently asserted

No-one in Ireland goes to prison because they cannot pay a debt

Though correct as to the position in law, arguably I was wrong because of the failure to observe due process by some judges.

Earlier this year, it was reported that the relevant legislation was to be challenged on constitutional grounds, with the Irish Human Rights Commission supporting the challenge.

A decision reported in "The Irish Times" this morning (See follow-up note dated 26 October 2013 below) suggests that this may not be necessary.

The report is, as is normal, written for the general audience and is not necessarily complete as to what lawyers would regard as the relevant details, or the detailed ratio decidendi. (I note that Eoin O'Dell has recently repeated his criticism of the delay in publishing the full judgments of the Irish superior courts.) That said, O'Neill J.'s decision as reported seems to me to admirably set out the standards which ought to apply when a creditor applies to a court to have someone imprisoned for failure to pay.

(As an aside: why are so many of the cases which get publicity initiated by credit unions ? Does it reflect sub-normal attention to public relations ?)

Note that a failure to pay by itself is not a ground for such an application: the failure must be to comply with a previous order by the court that the debtor pay a specific amount. Now, it may not be generally realised, but in Ireland, when such a failure occurs, the creditor may realistically have very little legal option but to apply for such an order, even if putting the debtor in prison is of no use, and indeed may be counter-productive. The creditor may not be unreasonable in believing that to apply is the only way to get the debtor's attention.

However, this is by no means always the explanation for the application, or if it is, something is going wrong on a regular basis, because yesterday's case, as well as the case referenced here (and here), all appear to be cases of "can't pay" rather than "won't pay". In all of the latter cases, and, I suspect, in virtually all cases of this kind, the debtor has failed to turn up in court, or, as it is often censoriously expressed, has ignored the summons to attend.

Judges are invariably wont to take umbrage at this, and my sympathy for debtors notwithstanding, I tend to agree with this, at least up to a point. I cannot agree, though, that, as has happened, it is appropriate to sentence someone - in absentia - to prison for up to three months because the judge is annoyed with failure to turn up.

It appears likely, as well, that creditors are either encouraging judges to do this, or failing to suggest more suitable alternatives such as adjournments.

Presumably encouraged by Conor Devally S.C., the debtor's counsel, O'Neill J. has now made such inappropriate happenings much more unlikely, if not completely impossible, by interpreting section 6 of The Enforcement of Court Orders Act,1940 in a new way.

The said Section 6 reads as follows

• ( a ) where a debtor is liable, by virtue of an instalment order, to pay a debt and costs either in one payment or by instalments and such debtor fails to make such payment or fails to pay any one or more of such instalments accruing due while such order is in force at the time or times appointed in that behalf by such order, the creditor may, at any time while such order is in force or within twelve months after it has ceased to be in force, apply to a Justice of the District Court for the arrest and imprisonment of such debtor;
• (b) on the hearing of an application under the next preceding paragraph of this section, the Justice may, if he so thinks proper but subject to the next following paragraph of this section, order the arrest and imprisonment of the debtor for any period not exceeding three months, and thereupon the debtor shall be arrested and imprisoned accordingly;
• ( c ) the Justice shall not order the arrest and imprisonment of the debtor under the next preceding paragraph of this section if the debtor (if he appears) shows, to the satisfaction of such Justice, that his failure to pay was due neither to his wilful refusal nor to his culpable neglect;
• ( d ) on the hearing of an application under paragraph (a) of this section, the Justice, if he so thinks proper, may, in lieu of ordering the arrest and imprisonment of the debtor, treat such application as an application under the next preceding section of this Act for the variation of the said instalment order and thereupon the said next preceding section shall apply as if such application were an application thereunder;

O'Neill J. appears to have decided that section 6(c) may not be interpreted so as to place the onus on the debtor to satisfy the court as to his or her inability, as has been the practice - in accordance, to be fair, with the most obvious meaning of the words - but that it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that s/he is either wilfully refusing, or is culpably neglecting, to pay. This, the standard of proof in criminal cases, is appropriate because the criminal sanction of imprisonment is involved.

Update on Saturday, October 26, 2013 at 09:51AM by Fergus O'Rourke

Unfortunately, I can no longer find the original 2009 links, but for those seeking more detail this one and this will, I think, prove useful further reading