Why I Voted No - addendum
I promised the other day to explain why I was "almost" able to accept the QMV changes, the loss of a Commissioner for part of the time and that there was no threat to Irish neutrality. Unfortunately, I found the second part of the explanation for my vote so difficult to write that I forgot my promise. I remedy that now.
Neutrality:I am persuaded that the so-called "triple-lock" does protect Irish neutrality. However, as I voted really as a European on European issues, I am still a bit uneasy at the eagerness of other member states to emphasise the military aspect of the Union. Indeed, there continues to be confusion in the minds of many, especially in Mittel- and Eastern Europe, between NATO and the EU;
Loss of Commissioner: To be accurate, this battle was lost in the Nice referendum. Enough said.
Changes to QMV: By this, I mean to refer both to the extension of QMV (= loss of veto in many areas) and to the change of QMV weights. The logic of these is plausible, but not that difficult to counter. These are effectively irreversible changes to the balance of power in the EU. I am comfortable with their general direction, and in particular am happy to see Germany's weight increase, but not really with their drastic nature, especially in the light of the passerelle provision. (See below).
The passerelle would allow future constitutional changes to be made without the need for a new treaty provided the leaders of the member states unanimously so agreed at the time. This looks even creepier now that the referendum result has exposed the huge gap between the political elite and the People. I am not entirely reassured by the opinion of many Lisbon advocates that no Irish Taoiseach could agree without a referendum, and besides I care about the rights of voters in other members of the Union as well.
I would emphasise, though, that none of the above counted for more with me than the issues of democratic legitimacy to which I referred in Part 2.
Reader Comments (2)
Regarding your concerns about deomractic legitimacy. You admit that many aspects of it are related to our own political elite. Very true, and for example we only improved our Dáil scrutiny of EU positions and legislation after Nice I. The act which does so sets up a committee which the relevant minister has to liase with and report to. But the committee could be stronger and it is recognised that Denmark has the most robust EU scrutiny in its national parliament. We could and should go as far as the Danes.
But back to the deficit at Eu level. Precisely where do you think the biggest problem lies? Under Lisbon EU legislation needs to be passed by two bodies which are directly elected by the people: the Council and the European Parliament. I am the first to admit that more transparency and accountability measures (such as the scrutiny I mention) are required. Lisbon makes a considerable improvement in this direction - pulling in national parliaments, making council legislative meetings public, and bringing the EU parliament to the centre of legislating. Where do you see improvements upon this?